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COMMENT
OCEAN SHIPPING CONFERENCES AND THE FEDERAL
MARITIME COMMISSION
In the Shipping Act of 1916,1 Congress created a unique system of
regulating international merchant carriers. The system is based upon
anti-competitive conferences which fix discriminatory rates.2 Congress
also provided for a regulatory agency, the Federal Maritime Commission, designed to control the monopoly characteristics of these conferences in order to avoid detriment to American firms and to protect
these agreements from United States antitrust legislation. To enable
the Commission to fulfill the latter function, section 15 of the Shipping
Act of 1916 provides that agreements "fixing or regulating transportation rates or fares" filed with and approved by the Commission will be
exempt from antitrust regulation,3 and that the Commission must grant
approval to all such agreements that do not violate enumerated statutory criteria.
The Commission shall by order, after notice and hearing,
disapprove, cancel or modify any agreement, or any modification
or cancellation thereof, whether or not previously approved by it,
that it finds to be unjustly discriminatory or unfair as between
carriers, shippers, exporters, importers, or ports, or between exporters from the United States and their foreign competitors, or
to operate to the detriment of the commerce of the United States,
or to be contrary to the public interest, or to be in violation of
this Act, and shall approve all other agreements, modifications
or cancellations. 4
In order to fulfill its dual function, the Commission is given the
power to conduct hearings and to subpoena documentsY Although
recently held to extend throughout the world, 6 the Commission's sub1 39 Stat. 728, as amended, 46 U.S.C. §§ 801-49 (1964) (Supp. II, 1965-66) as amended,
81 Stat. 544 (1 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 589 (1967)).
2 "Virtually no one denies that conference organization is a major 4jepature from
free competition." McGee, Ocean Freight Rate Conferences and the American Merchant
Marine, 27 U. Cm. L. REy. 191, 271 (1960).
3 39 Stat. 733, as amended, 75 Stat. 763 (1961), 46 U.S.C. § 814 (1964),
4 Id.
5 46 U.S.C. § 826 (1964), as amended, 81 Stat. 544 (1 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 589
(1967)),
6 See FMC v. DeSmedt, 366 F.2d 464, 471-73 .(2d Cir.), aff'g Ludlow CQrp. y. DeSmedt,
249 F. Supp. 496, 500 (S.D.N.Y.) fert. denied, 385 U.S. 974 (1966).
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poeha power has, in fact, been limited to those foreign countries willing
to allow the Commission to investigate domiciliary firms.7 As a result,
the Commission's efforts to conduct hearings concerning the rates employed by conferences under approved agreements have been nullified
by the refusal of numerous foreign governments to allow their carriers
to obey Commission subpoenas. 8 The Commission, unable to perform
its assigned function, has, for the first time, reacted by disbanding the
offending conference.9 The net effect, under a recent Supreme Court
decision holding antitrust sanctions applicable to unapproved conferences,' 0 has been to remove the antitrust immunity of the conference
members.
Although the expansion of antitrust jurisdiction and the restriction
on the Commission's subpoena power have developed independently,
both events stem from a common source-the recent revitalization of
the Commission's regulatory efforts. The outcome of these events has
been the Commission's decision to disband noncomplying conferences.
The legality and wisdom of its response, however, are suspect.
I
THE MARITIME INDUSTRY DILEMMA

A. The Earlier Situatioi: 1916-1958
Prior to 1958,11 there was little danger that an approved conference
would subsequently be disapproved and disbanded. Similarly, it was
unlikely that either a disapproved conference or an unapproved conference would have antitrust proceedings brought against it. One reason
for this situation was the FMC's failure to determine, through investigation, whether approved standards had, in fact, been met. As Clarence
G. Morse, then Chairman of the FMC, told an antitrust subcommittee,
7 See FMC v. DeSmedt, 268 F. Supp. 972, 975-76 (S.b.N.Y. 1967).
8 See, e.g., Calkutta, East Coast of India & East Pakistan/U.S.A. Conf: F.M.C. R6; 67-83,

at 9 (Sept. 14, 1967).
9 Id. at 5.
10 Carnation Co. v. Pacific Westbound Conf., 383 U.S. 213, modified, 883 U.S. 932
(1966), distinguishingUnited States Nay. Co. v. Cunard S.S. Co., 284 U.S. 414 (1932); Far
East Con. v. United States, 342 U.S. 570 (1952).
11 Although any attempt to isolate the source of the maritime industry's present
turmoil would be artificial, the Supreme Court's decision in Federal Maritime Ed. v.
Isbrandtsen Co., 356 U.S. 481 (1958), clearly engendered the legislative concern that resulted in the 1961 amendment to the Shipping Act. See American Export Isbrandtsen
Lines, Inc. v. FMC, 380 F.2d 609, 616 (D.C.. Cir. 1967). The Isbrandtsen decision of 1958
held that the dual rate contracts employed to "tie" shippers to the conference are illegal
when "employed as predatory devices," 356 US. at 499.
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the Commission operated on the premise that all agreements filed for
section 15 approval were prima facie valid, unless the Commission subsequently investigated and discovered a defect. 12 As a result, all conference agreements were initially approved, and thus were exempt from
antitrust proceedings.
A corollary to the Commission's willingness to grant agreements
prima facie validity was its less than zealous efforts to investigate those
agreements initially "approved." That for a period of fifty-two years,
the power to disband a conference had never been used, is indicative
of the Commission's old attitude. The only suggestion that such power
existed appeared as dictum in a 1935 Commission decision.' 3 Thus, the
filing of rates and agreements for section 15 exemptions was an empt
formality, and the conference procedure of modifying rates within
agreements at will, subject only to notification of the Commission
within thirty days was, in effect, a carte blanche.' 4
12 Hearings on Monopoly Problems in Regulated Industries Before the Antitrust
Subcomm. of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 86th Cong., 1st & 2d Sess., pt. 1, at 12
(1960) [hereinafter cited as Celler Hearings]. "When agreements are submitted for Board
approval they are examined for completeness, clarity, and prima facie validity under
applicable provisions of the Shipping Act .... " Id. For a discussion of the doctrine of
prima fade validity of conference agreements, see Celler Hearings, pt. 1, at 1009, 1013
(letter from Thos. E. Stakem, Jr., Vice-Chairman, Federal Maritime Board, to Representative Emanuel Celler, Feb. 17, 1960):
It might be contended, contrary to the conclusions set forth above, that approval under Section 15 is a mere privilege, not a right, and that the Board has
the power to deny this privilege for whatever reason it deems fit. This argument
is necessarily based on the premise, however, that the word "shall" may be read
as permissive rather than mandatory. Such a premise is inconsistent with the
several considerations set forth above.
The statute clearly states than unless such an agreement is
unjustly discriminatory or unfair as between carriers [or] shippers . . . or to operate to the detriment of the commerce of the United States, or to be contrary
to the public interest, or to be in violation of this Act ... [it shall be approved].
Shipping Act of 1916, § 15, as amended, 75 Stat. 763 (1961), 46 U.S.C. § 814 (1964).
It is interesting to note that a similar assumption was employed by the Civil
Aeronautics Board. See Bebchick, The International Air Transport Association and
the Civil Aeronautics Board, 25 J. Am.L. & COM. R (1958), stating that as of Nov. 13,
1957, "The Board will now require that certain agreements which are reached informally
within IATA be submitted to CAB for formal approval. In the past such agreements took
effect unless specifically disapproved." Id. at 23.
13 Edmond Veil, Inc. v. Italian Line, 1 U.S.S.B.B. 395 (1935):
An unreasonably high rate is clearly detrimental to the commerce of the United
States, and upon a showing that a conference rate in foreign commerce is unreasonably high the Department will require its reduction to a proper level. If
necessary, approval of the conference agreement will be withdrawn.
Id. at 898.
14 [T]he provisions of Part 235 [46 C.F.R. part 235, containing the Maritime
Board's rules of general applicability for preparing rate schedules] are seen not
to constitute tariff requirements at all, since they call for no statement of rates
currently in force or binding for the future .... They merely call for a mass of
detailed rate history . ...
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The "automatic" antitrust immunity resulting from the Commission's failure to investigate conference agreements at or subsequent to
filing was finally attacked by the courts despite the vigorous protests of
the Commission. In two cases decided in 1954, River Plate& Brazil Conferences v. Pressed Steel Car Co.15 and Pacific Westbound Conference
v. Leval & Co.,16 a federal district court and the Oregon Supreme Court
held that there could be no recovery of liquidated damages for breach
of a contract based upon a dual rate agreement, unless the agreement
was formally approved by the Commission. 7 In a third case, Isbrandtsen
Co. v. United States,'" the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia interpreted section 15 to provide "that such agreements or modifications 'shall be lawful only when and as long as approved' by the
Board."' 9 The necessary implication of these decisions was that such
unapproved dual rate contracts were not entitled to antitrust exemption. Significantly, at that time, most such contracts had never been
specifically approved by the Commission. The Commission's reaction
was simply to ignore these decisions. For example, in response to a
letter concerning unapproved dual rate conferences in light of the
Pressed Steel Car Co. case, the Commission wrote that it was not aware
of any such contracts. 20 The response was based upon the assumption
that tacit approval remained sufficient,21 and, consequently, the doctrine
of prima facie legality of conference agreements, including dual rate
contracts, and its corollary of automatic exemption from antitrust pro22
ceedings continued well beyond these decisions.
A second reason for the almost total immunity of shipping conferGalland, Steamship Tariffs in Foreign Commerce, 35 TUL. L. REv. 141, 150 (1960). For the
history of the Commission's rate regulations, see id. at 150-64.
15 124 F. Supp. 88 (S.D.N.Y. 1954), aff'd, 227 F.2d 60 (2d Cir. 1955).
16 201 Ore. 390, 269 P.2d 541, cert. denied, 348 U.S. 897 (1954).
17 River Plate & Brazil Confs. v. Pressed Steel Car Co., 124 F. Supp. 88, 91 (S.D.N.Y.
1954); Pacific Westbound Con. v. Leval & Co., 201 Ore. 390, 396, 269 P.2d 541, 543-44
(1954); see Celler Hearings, supra note 12, pt. 1, at 79.
18 211 F.2d 51 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 347 U.S. 990 (1954).
'9 Id. at 56 (emphasis in original); see Celler Hearings,pt. 1, at 79.
20 In this exchange of correspondence, Stauffer Chemical Co. asked for a list
of those outward steamship conferences whose contracts had not been formally
approved by the Board in the light of the Pressed Steel Car Co. case. . . . In
answer to this letter, the Secretary of the Board replied that the Board was not
aware of any steamship conferences who employed contracts requiring approval
which had not been approved by the Board.... In the light of the Isbrandtsen
case, Pressed Steel Car case, and Leval case, was not this reply rather misleading?
Celler Hearings, pt. 1, at 95 (statement of Representative Emanuel Celler, Chairman, Antitrust Subcommittee, Committee on Judiciary).
21 "This again, gets into the question of tacit approval or formal approval." Id. (statement of Mr. Morse, Federal Maritime Board Chairman, in response to the Committee
Chairman's question, supra note 20).
22 See note 12 supra.
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ences during this period was the complete absence of communication
between the Maritime Commission and the Justice Department. 23 This
can be traced to the Commission's restrictive interpretation of the role
that antitrust should play in the regulation of the shipping industry.
Indeed, in hearings before the Antitrust Subcommittee of the Committee on the Judiciary, the Commission's counsel expressed the view
that mere participation in the international shipping industry was sufficient to exempt a firm from antitrust regulation by the Justice Department. Failure to file an agreement was considered a violation of
the Shipping Act only, and not of the antitrust provisions. Punishment
in such a case was a civil penalty of $1,000 per day. Interestingly, how24
ever, no such penalty had ever been enforced.
B. Antitrust and The Shipping Industry
Although several early cases25 had challenged the Commission's
pre-1958 assumption that antitrust sanctions were totally inapplicable
to the shipping industry, it was not until 1966 that antitrust jurisdiction
was finally established. In Carnation Co. v. Pacifir Westbound Conference,2 6 the Supreme Court held that the Shipping Act of 1916, specifically section 15, was not designed to give the shipping industry complete antitrust immunity. Two earlier cases 27 implying that such an
immunity existed were distinguished on the ground that in those situations the actions of the Court would have interfered with the lawful
proceedings of the Commission. Thus, under the Carnation holding,
antitrust sanctions may be applied "so long as the courts refrain from
taking action which might interfere with the Commission's exercise of
its lawful powers." 28 When the Commission withdraws a conference's
section 15 approval, however, subsequent court action finding an antirole.
trust violation would in no way infringe upon the Commission's
29
Indeed, this result would be contemplated by the Commission.

23 In discussing an agreement not subject to. § 15 exemption before the Antitrust
Subcommittee, the Maritime Board's counsel indicated that until this time the Commission "Thad] not . . . reported such an agreement to the Department of Justice." Celler
Hearinigs,pt. 1, at 45 (testimony of Mr. Aptaker, Chief, Regulation Branch, Office Pf General Counsel, Federal Maritime Board).
24 Id. at 70-71 (testimony of Mr. Morse).
25 See cases cited note 17 supra.
26 383 U.S. 213, modified, 383 U.S. 932 (1966), rev'g 336 F.2d 650 (9th Cir. 1964).
27 Far East Conf. v. United States, 342 U.S. 570 (1952); United States Nav. Co. v.
Cunard S.S. Co., 284 U.S. 474 (1932).
28 383 U.S. at 221.
29 See, e.g., Calcutta, East Coast of India 8&East Pakistan/U.SA. Con!. F.M.C. No 67-33,
at 9 (Sept. 14, 1967).
I might say, generally, that if the Commission cannot obtain this type of
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With Carnation as precedent, seVeral cases have been initiated in
an effort to employ antitrust sanctions against offending shipping conferences. In Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. AMerican PresidentLines,
Ltd.,3 0 a federal district court extended the principle adopted in Carnation to, allow the initiation of discovery proceedings in a treble damage
suit prior to completion of the Commission's hearing.31
More recently, the Commission decided that fifteen conference
members had "conspir[ed] to destroy" the independent Sapphire Steamship Line, and determined that the briginial section 15 agreement was
illegal as filed.32 On the basis of these findings, Sapphire is pressing a
$3.5 million treble damage suit against the offending conference mem83
bers.
Although the ultimate impact of the application of antitrust legislation to the shipping industry will depend upon the Commission's
attitude toward the conference structute, these cases demonstrate the
dramatic change in the effectiveness of the Commission's power to
disband a noncomplying conference. The crucial issue is the desirability
of applying this power.
C. Discovery and Subpoena Power
Implicit in a discussion of the scope of the Maritime Commission's
subpoena authority 4 is the assumption that it is used. Prior to 1958,
the Commission's presumption of prlma facie Validity of conference
agreements negated any pressing requirement to subpoena materials
information then it cannot perforni its statutory furictions of regulating conferences. If it cannot perform these functions, then the whole question of permitting the existence of conferences, which 2re quite simply legalized tartels,
will have to be reviewed. Congress, in immunizing conferences from the antitrust
lavs, did so only on the condition and the assumption that these anticompetitive
bodies could and would be submitted to the supervision of the Federal Maritime
Commission.
Hearings on Discriminatory Ocean Freight Rates and the Balance 6f Payments Before the
Joint Economic Comm., 88th cong., 1st &c2d Sess., pt. 4, at 651 (1964) (Statement of Adm.
John Harllee, Chairman, FMC) [hereinafter cited as Douglas Hearings]; see pp. 1079-80
infra.
30 266 F. Supp, 76 (S.D.NY. 1966).
31 Id. at 78-79. The court noted that in, Carnation the petitioner did not "seem to
have needed any discovery." A stay pending a final Commission determination of whether
a § 15 exemption is available to the conference had been granted. The court in Firestone,
while holding that the actual trial itself must await the Commission's decision, nevertheless permitted pre-trial discovery to proceed on the grounds that it would not interfere.
3 N.Y. Times, Dec. 13, 1967, at 93, col. 5.
as Id.; J. Cozrtmmca, Dec. 13, 1967, at 26, col. 3.
34 For an in-depth study of the situation prior to the enactment of a discovery procedure, see Galland, A Note on Maritime Discovery, 19 ADNIN. L. REv. 119, 124 (1966),
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for investigative purposes. 85 This presumption was finally eliminated,
however, by the Supreme Court's holding in FederalMaritime Board v.
Isbrandsten Co. that the dual rate agreement was illegal when used to
stifle the competition of independent carriers. 6 The ensuing legislation,
which preserved the dual rate contract system, dearly stipulated that
the Commission must actively judge each conference agreement underlying a dual rate tariff against the criteria of section 15.8 7
Consequently, in order for a conference member to avoid the
danger of antitrust prosecution, it is now essential that the conference
agreement and the various dual rate agreements employed by its members actually be filed and granted commission approval pursuant to
section 15 of the Shipping Act. Of equal importance in evaluating the
scope of the Commission's subpoena power is the fact that the Commission, under more dynamic leadership, has aggressively assumed its
statutory duty of conducting an investigation on the merits of each such
proposal and disapproving those agreements which fail to meet the
statutory guidelines. 8 To enable the Commission to perform this function, sections 21 and 27 of the Shipping Act of 1916 confer authority
to call on carriers and other regulated persons for "any periodical or
special report, or any account, record, rate or charge, or any memorandum of any facts and transactions" on pain of $100 for each day of
40
default,89 and to subpoena witnesses, books and papers.
Due to the international character of the shipping industry and
the preponderance of foreign firms in many conferences, the Commission must reach documents in the possession of persons associated with
firms not domiciled or incorporated in this country. Reaching such
documents is the Commission's principal regulatory problem. 41
Recently, in an attempt to alleviate the confusion of the subpoena
provision, Congress amended section 27 to give the Commission dis85 See, pp. 1071-74 supra.
36 356 U.S. 481 (1958).
87 Act of October 3, 1961, § 14(b), 75 Stat. 762, 46 U.S.C. §' 813a (1964).
38 Id.; see United States Ad. & Gulf/Australia-New Zealand Conf. v. FMC, 364 F.2d
696 (D.C. Cir. 1966); Aktiebolaget Svenska Amerika Linien v. FMC, 351 F.2d 756 (D.C. Cir.
1965) rev'd, 36 U.S.L.W. 4213 (U.S. March 6, 1968); Outward Continental N. Pac. Freight
Conf., F.M.C. No. 66-36 (Mar. 28, 1967).
89 Shipping Act of 1916, § 21, 39 Stat. 736, as amended, 46 U.S.C. § 820 (1964); see,
Galland, supra note 34, at 124.
40 Shipping Act of 1916, § 27, 46 U.S.C. § 826 (1964), as amended, 81 Stat. 544 (1 US.
CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 589 (1967)).
41 See FMC v. Anglo-Canadian Shipping Co., 335 F.2d 255 (9th Cir. 1964); FMC
v. DeSmedt, 268 F. Supp. 972 (S.D.N.Y. 1967); Calcutta, East Coast of India & East
PakistanlU.S.A. Conf., F.M.C. No. 67-33 (Sept. 14, 1967).
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covery power analogous to that contained in the federal rules.4 2 The
problem under amended section 27 is twofold: first, does the Commission have the authority to request such material from a foreign firm;
second, assuming the necessary authority, will the courts enforce the
Commission's order through contempt proceedings?
Under the original subpoena section, the answer to the first inquiry
is dearly yes. Although there was some discussion of the meaning
of the statutory language employed by the Commission to support its
claim to worldwide subpoena power,43 the Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit, in FMC v. DeSmedt," upheld a district court ruling
that the Commission's power to subpoena extended throughout the
world. The experience of other agencies under the federal rules indicates that the Commission's newly acquired discovery power will also
enjoy worldwide applicability.45
The question of court enforcement of a contempt proceeding
against a foreign firm for failure to comply with either the Commission's subpoena or discovery power demands presents a more difficult
problem. Although the federal courts have been willing to support the
Commission's subpoena power, they have always inserted one caveat
in their opinions. Thus the court of appeals in FMC v. DeSmedt
suggested that:
[W]e are not now confronted with an effort to hold a foreign carrier in contempt or to assess fines for refusing at its government's
command to produce documents in response to a subpoena, and
we ought not to anticipate that the problem will inevitably arise.4 6
Recently, however, the DeSmedt case was tried for the third time
on the issue of whether the federal courts could hold in contempt a foreign carrier that refused to comply with a Commission and court sub42 ,81 Stat. 544 (1 US. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 589 (1967)).
43 FMC v. DeSmedt, 366 F.2d 464, 474 (2d Cir. 1966) (dissenting opinion), noted in
52 IowA L. R v. 1022 (1967).
44 366 F.2d 464 (2d Cir.), af'g Ludlow v. DeSmedt, 249 F. Supp. 496 (S.D.N.Y. 1966),
cert. denied, 385 U.S. 974 (1967).
45 See, e.g., Socit6 Internationale v. Rogers, 357 U.S. 197 (1958).
46 366 F.2d at 473. Other examples of this caveat being employed to distinguish between a valid subpoena order and the power to enforce it are as follows: "The extent to
which the information could be forcibly elicited is another matter, not in the least rele-

vant to whether it may be lawfully demanded." Kerr S.S. Co. v. United States, 284 F.2d 61,
64 (2d Cir. 1960); "[T]he question as to whether the order can be enforced by extraterritorial means is not presently before us. All that is here involved is whether the order
was properly and validly issued." Montship Lines, Ltd. v. FMB, 295 F.2d 147, 154 (D.C.
Cir. 1961); see also Gardner, Steamship Conferences and the Shipping Act, 1916, 35 TU..

L. Rzv. 129, 140 (1960), where it is stated: "It is too early to say whether production of
documents can be compelled ... and whether disciplinary orders can in fact be enforced
abroad."
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poena order.4 7 Predictably, the court would not force a foreign firm to
violate the laws of its own country.4 8 In view of the widespread existence within foreign countries of laws forbidding compliance with foreign subpoenas of documents and other materials, and since a large
number of conference hearings by the Commission may eventually turn
on this issue, 49 the applicability of this decision to the newly enacted
discovery section is important.
In amending section 27 of the Shipping Act, 50 Congress declared
that "[b]ecause of the success of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in
simplifying and expediting litigation, the procedures therein provided
should be closely followed by the Commission .

. . ."51

The effect of

this amendment is to apply the present federal rules concerning discovery to hearings conducted by the Commission under section 22.52
Further, Congress indicated that although the former subpoena power
had been simplified, "[T]here [was] no intention to make any change in
the scope, nature or jurisdiction of [this] power."8 3 Thus, the nonetforceability precedent remains applicable to both the earlier subpoena power under section 27 and the investigative power under section 21.
Unfortunately, Federal Rules 34 and 37, pertaining to discovery
and enforcement, will not aid the Commission in its efforts to reach
documents located in an unwilling foreign country. In Socidtd Internationale v. Roges 5 4 the Supreme Court held that:
... Rule 37 should not be construied tO authorize dismnissal bf this
47 FMC v. DeSmedt, 268 F. Supp. 972 (S.D.N.Y. 1967).
48 Id. at 975; see p. 1079 & note 56 infra.
49 See Comment, Jgate 1Pegulaidn in Ocean Shipping, 78 HAR'. L. Rav. 635, 643
(1965):
In 1963 the Commission served section 21 orders on sixteen conferences.... The
inbound conferences are domiciled abroad, and they and the foreign members of
all sixteen conferences Were supported by their govirnments in refusing to comply
with the Commission's orders. The Commission suspended the orders as to them
and sought to persuade their governments voluntarily to furnish documents
located outside the United States. To date [19 65], the Commission has not
vacated the suspension of the orders.
50 46 U.S.C. § 826 (1964), as amended, 81 Stat. 544 (1 US. CODE CoNG. & AD, NEws 589
(1967)).
51 S. REP. No. 472, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1967).
52 Id. It is interesting to note that discovery procedure is not entirely new to the
Commission. In fact, they had enacted their own discovery rule (Rule of Practice 12(k), 46
C.F.R. § 201.211 (Supp. 1963)) which was subsequently invalidated by the court decision
in FMC v. Anglo-Canadian Shipping Co.j 335 F2d 255 (9th Cir. 1964). This provision
was cited with approval in the report of the Commerce Committee accompanying the
present act. S. REP. No. 472, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1967).
53 S. REP. No. 472, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1967).
54 357 U.S. 197 (1958), noted in 46 CALiF. L. Rav. 836, 841 (1958).
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complaint because of petitioner's noncompliance with a pretrial
production order when it has been established that failure to
comply has been due to inability, and not to willfulness, bad faith,
or any fault of petitioner.55
Further, the basic premise of the Supreme Court's approval, that
a party should not be forced to violate the laws of his own country, has
continued to be supported in courts throughout the country.5 6 Thus,
the Commission's problem of reaching materials in order to investigate
a questionable agreement or rate remains.
D. The Commission's Response
The final and only variable element in the dilemma facing the
maritime industry is the Commission's reaction to the restrictions of
its subpoena authority on the one hand, and to the application of antitrust sanctions on the other. If the conference system is to be preserved,
the Commission must be willing to accept the limitations upon its subpoena authority, and must adopt a less autocratic regulatory procedure.
The Maritime Commission's recent efforts to gain control of thP
rates and procedures of the various conferences dealing with the United
States demonstrates, however, that the Commission is not willing to
stand aside and allow the conferences to, in effect, regulate themselves.
The new attitude was articulated by present Commission Chairman,
Adm. John Harllee, in the recent Douglas Hearings:
[I]f the Commission cannot obtain this type of information
[documents from foreign member-firms] then it cannot perform
its statutory functions of regulating conferences. If it cannot perform these functions, then the whole question of permitting the
are quite simply legalized cartels,
existence of conferences, which
57
reviewed.
be
to
have
will
That this statement was no idle threat, is amply demonstrated by
the Commission's action in disbanding both the Calcutta Conference
and, more recently, the Outward Continental North Pacific Freight
Conference. 58
55 Id. at 212.
56 See, e.g., Socidt6 Internationale v. Rogers, 357 U.S. 196 (1958); Application of Chase
Manhattan Bank, 297 F.2d 611 (2d Cir. 1962); First Natl City Bank v. IRS, 271 F.2d 616
(2d Cir. 1959), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 948 (1960); SEC v. Minas De Artemisa, S.A., 150 F.2d
215 (9th Cir. 1945); United States v. Standard Oil Co., g3 F.R.D. 1 (S.D.N.Y. 1958). See
Comment, Rate Regtqlation in Ocean Shipping, 78 HA~v. L. REv. 635, 643 (1965). But cf.

Fontaine v. SEC, 259 F, Supp. 880 (D.PR. 1966).
57 Douglas Hearings,supra note 29, pt. 4, at 651.

58 Calcutta, East Coast of India & East Pakistan/U,S.A. Conf., F.M.C. No, 67-33 (Sept.
14, 1967). Outward Continental N. Pac. Freight Conf., F.M.C. No. 66-36 (Mar. 28, 1967);
see J. Comnmrnacr, Oct. 30, 1967, at 36, col. 2.
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In disbanding the Outward Continental Conference, 9 the Commission based its decision upon the specific provisions added to section
15 by the 1961 amendment, requiring each conference to adopt an
approved internal policing system. 60 At the hearing, it was apparently
stipulated that the conference had failed to meet this provision. Outward Continental defended on the ground that the Commission could
not "disapprove its agreement without a specific finding ... that the
agreement operates in one of the four ways set out in section 15."61
The merits of this contention and the propriety of the Commission's
actions generally under section 15 were not considered, however, the
Commission ruling only that there was inadequate policing. 62 Thus,
Outward Continental serves merely as an additional example of the
Commission's get-tough policy with conferences.
Of more importance in ascertaining the Commission's present atti63
tude toward section 15, is the disbanding of the Calcutta Conference.
The Commission made little effort to ground its ruling on a factual
violation of the statutory language of section 15. Instead, it held that
the concept of regulation by the Maritime Commission was basic to
the presupposition of antitrust immunity. Further, the Commission decided that if it continued to be impossible to reach documents located
abroad because of hostile foreign law, it had no alternative but to remove those firms from section 15 exemption, not for statutory reasons,
but simply because the justification behind their exemption had failed. 64
In essence, the Commission has overreached the specific language of the
act in an attempt either to gain a more receptive foreign attitude to59 Outward Continental N. Pac. Freight Conf., F.M.C. No. 66-36 (Mar. 28, 1967); aff'd,
385 F.2d 981 (D.C. Cir. 1967).
60 Id. at 2.
The Commission shall disapprove any such agreement, after notice and hearing, on a finding of inadequate policing of the obligations under it, or of failure
or refusal to adopt and maintain reasonable procedures for promptly and fairly
hearing and considering shippers' requests and complaints.
75 Stat. 764 (1961), 46 U.S.C. § 814 (1964).
61 Outward Continental N. Pac. Freight Conf., F.M.C. No. 66-36, at 4-5 (Mar. 28, 1967).
62 Id. at 5.
63 Calcutta, East Coast of India & East Pakistan/U.S.A. Conf., F.M.C. No. 67-33 (Sept.
14, 1967), appeal docketed, No. 21,355, D.C. Cir., 1967.
64 Since effective supervision and control of respondents' concerted activities is
not possible in the present posture of the conference, the antitrust exemption
which our approval granted respondents must be withdrawn. To do so is not to
punish respondents in any sense of the word. All we are doing here is to restore
the regulatory forces of free and open competition. We cannot do otherwise
under the law and still protect shippers, both exporters and importers from the
possibility of unreasonably high rates which could result from an unfettered
freedom of concerted anticompetitive activity.
Id. at 9.
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ward Commission regulation, or to eliminate much of the conference
system.
Because of the practical significance of this new approach, the
Commission's role in light of the Calcutta Conference case must be
reevaluated.
II
DISBANDING OF CONFERENCES-AN UNSATISFACTORY APPROACH

The Commission has taken a strong stance to preserve what it feels
is its proper function in regulating the foreign commerce of the United
States. This position is not, however, supported by either legislative
intent underlying the Congressional reaffirmation of section 15 or by
statutory construction. Also, in light of the present economic structure
of the shipping industry,6 5 the wisdom of the Commission's discretionary disbanding policy is questionable.
A. Statutory Construction
Section 15 originally provided three criteria for determining continued approval of a conference:
The [Commission shall] . . . disapprove, cancel, or modify
any agreement . . . that it finds to be unjustly discriminatory or
unfair as between carriers, shippers, exporters, importers or ports,
or between exporters from the United States and their foreign
competitors, or to operate to the detriment of the commerce of the
United States, or to be in violation of this Act .... 66
The 1961 amendment preserved these original criteria and established
a fourth qualification-the Commission shall "disapprove, cancel, or
67
modify any agreement . . . contrary to the public interest."
Thus, the Commission's power to disband conferences that refuse
to comply with subpoena demands is not specifically granted under
section 15. Consequently, the issue turns on the meaning of the sentence granting the Commission power to approve conferences: "The
Commission . . . shall approve all other agreements, modifications or
cancellations." s Prior to Isbrandtsen, the Commission operated on the
premise that there was no discretion granted it in approving conference
agreements. 60 This appears to be the only defensible construction of
section 15.
05 See pp. 1085-88 infra.

66 Shipping Act of 1916, § 15, 39 Stat. 734.
67 75 Stat. 763 (1961), 46 U.S.C. § 814 (1964).
68 Id. (emphasis added).
09 See p. 1072 supra.
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I The issue of the Commission's discretion was recently considered
by the Supreme Court in FMC v. Aktiebolaget Svenska Amerika
Linien.70 Although it upheld the Commission's contention that any
agreement contrary to United States antitrust laws is rebuttably presumed contrary to the public interest,71 and thus voidable under section
15, the Court reaffirmed that the Commission must "adduce substantial
evidence to support a finding under one of the four standards of
§ 15 .... ,,7"
Applying a nondiscretionary construction of section 15
to the Commission's decision in the Calcutta Conference case, the determinative question is whether the Commission "adduced substantial
evidence" to justify its decision.
The Commission based its decision to disband the conference for
noncompliance with subpoena demands upon a 1916 Congressional
assumption that some governmental agency would control combinations granted an exemption under section 15.73 The Commission stated:

[T]he public interest requires that we remove the aegis of section
15 from the concerted activities of an anticompetitive combination
whose refusal to supply lawfully demanded information frustrates
our efforts at effective supervision and control of those activities
and deprives a shipper in our commerce of the necessary means to
prosecute his complaint ilider the Act.7 4
The Supreme Court's decision in FMC -. A ktiebolaget Svenska Amerika
Linien75 indicates that the threshold problem is whether the Calcutta
Conference, having refused to obey a Commission subpoena, is, without
further proof of wrongdoing, rebuttably presumed to violate the public
interest. Both the Congressional intent behind the 1961 amendment,
and the economic underpinings of the shipping industry, suggest that
70 36 UiS.L.W. 4213 (U.S. Mar. 6, 1968).
71 Id. at 4217.
72 Id. at 4215.
U3 The antitrust exemption tvhich results from the approval of agreements under
section 15 was granted by Congress only on the assumption that the anticompetitive
minbinations thereby authorized would be effectively supervised and
controlled by an agency of the government.
Calcutta, EasL Coast of India & East Pakistan/U.S.A. Conf., F.M.C. No. 67-33, at 4 (Sept. 14,
1967). The authrity cited to support this proposition is derived principaliy from the
1914 Alexander Report and the House reports on the 1961 amendment. With the, exception of § 18(b)(5), providing for the control of rates, however, the strong bill desired by

the House.was rejected, and the more moderate Senate version passed into law. See H.R.
REP. No. 1247, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. (1961) (accompanying H.R. 6775). See discussion of
legislative intent, pp. 1083-85 infra.
74 Calcutta, East Coast of India & East Pakistan/U.S.A. Conf., F.M.C. No. 67-33, at 5
(Sept. 14, 1967) (emphasis added).
75 36 U.S.L.W. 4213 (U.S. March 6, 1968).
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Congress did not intend such a presumption. Moreover, if 'the Commission must affirmatively demonstrate detriment to the public interest, can it justifiably contend that. noncompliance with subpoena is
alone sufficient to "deprive a shipper in our commerce of the necessary
means to prosecute his complaint under the act"? Since section 18(b)
6
(5), 7 enacted as part of the 1961 amendment, -provides an alternative
approach to regulating the detrimental rate situation which avoids the
subpoena difficulties inherent in the present procedure, there is no such
justification.
B. Legislative Intent
In 1961, following years of moratorium legislation limiting the
impact of the Supreme Court's decision in FederalMaritime Board v,
Isbrandtsen Co.,77 Congress enacted what it considered a more permanent solution to the shipping conference dilemma.7 8 The motivation
for the amendment was a desire to legalize the dual rate contract held
discriminatory in Isbrandtsen; however, as a result of extensive hearings, the legislators also found it necessary to modify section 15.
The legislative history of the 1961 amendment reveals that Congress again decided that the shipping conference system, based upon
the principal of private internal regulation of rates, was the most de79
sirable regulatory device.
Both the actual additions to section 15 and various suggested
amendments support this position. The legislators added a clause emphasizing the necessity of internal self-regulation:
The Commission shall disapprove any such agreement, after notice
and hearing, on a finding of inadequate policing of the obligations
under it, or of failure or refusal to adopt and maintain reasonable
76 46 U.S.C. § ,817(b)(5).(1964).
77 356 U.S. 481 (1958). See note 11 supra.
78 Act of October 3,_ 1961, § 14(b), 75 Stat. 762, 46 U.S.C. § 814 (1964).
79 See S. REP. No. 860, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1961), where it is stated: "The primary
purpose of this amended bill is to authorize ocean common carriers and conferences
thereof serving the foreign commerce of the United States to enter into effective and fair
dual rate contracts with shippers." In American Export Isbrandtsen Lines, Inc. v. TMC,
380 F.2d 609, 617 (1967), the court commented: "The Bill as finally reported and passed
represented largely a triumph for the conference interests in that most of the antitrust
aspects of the legislation were deleted and dual rate contracts were legalized." FMC,
FACT FINDING INVESTIGATION No. 6, TE EFFECts OF STEAMSHIP CONFERENCE ORGANIZATION,
PROCnURE, RULES, REGULATIONS AND PRAbTICES UPON' THE FOREIGN COMWERCE OF THE
UNITED STATES, at 5 (1967) [hereinafter cited as Dickson Report] states: "[T]he conference
system has generally served the purposes for which it was designed, if somewhat imperfectly, and . . . there may be no feasible alternafive for serving the same purpose,
taking hIto account the practical considerations involved in international commerce."
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procedures for promptly and fairly hearing and considering
shippers' requests and complaints.8 0

A House proposal requiring foreign carriers to appoint an agent to
accept service of process was rejected, however, thereby denying the
Commission a valuable regulatory device and further implementing
the principal of private internal regulation. 81 A second House-suggested

amendment to section 15, requiring that conferences be approved only
if significant independent competition existed to serve as an effective
regulatory device, was also rejected conclusively by the Senate committee. The Senate report aptly pointed out that the two assumptions
upon which such an amendment would rest, independent competition
and strong conference activity, were mutually exclusive.8 2 Finally, only
one of the House provisions designed to strengthen the Commission's
3
position was adopted in the Senate; and that only after bitter debate.
As amended, section 18(b)(5) gives the Commission the power to establish maximum and minimum rates.8 4
Thus, in effect this amendment was a severe compromise between two distinct outlooks on the methods to be employed by the
Commission. 5 The FMC has the duty to investigate conference ac-

tivities, to approve maximum and minimum rates, and to regulate
internal policing of conferences. To enable the Commission to perform

these functions, Congress authorized the fining of conferences using
unapproved rates and the disbanding of those failing either to police
their own activities or to meet the four general criteria outlined in
section 15.86 But the power to subpoena foreign documents necessary
to conduct such investigations was, in effect, denied. Congress neither
80

75 Stat. 763 (1961), 46 U.S.C. § 814 (1964).
81 See S. REP'. No. 860, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. 25 (1961).
82 Clearly then, under standards such as these, few if any effective dual-rate
contracts could be approved by the Commission. And those which were approved
would be under a constant sword of disapproval. To make matters worse, the
sword would be in the hands of nonconference lines which could wield it or
not as they saw fit.
Id. at 23.
83 Your committee finds, however, that it would be a serious mistake at this
time in world affairs for the U.S. Government unilaterally to assert by statute
such a bold claim of right to sit in judgment of the "reasonableness" of international ocean freight rates.
Id. at 25.
84 46 U.S.C. § 817(b)(5) (1964). See pp. 1088-93 infra.
85 See American Export Isbrandtsen Lines, Inc. v. FMC, 380 F.2d 609 (1967): "A
large part of the Senate hearings was taken up with attempting to reconcile the divergent
and almost contradictory provisions in the House Bill." Id. at 617.
86 46 U.S.C. § 814 (1964).
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authorized nor tacitly approved Commission authority to enforce its
own subpoenas.8 7
The Congressional report indicates that the legislators viewed such
authority as neither politically feasible nor desirable:
"[S]aying" the Commission has such powers, which obviously it
cannot enforce effectively against the nationals of unwilling
foreign governments, would result only in such provisions being
enforceable effectively against American-Flag lines, thereby prejudicing them in relation to their relatively unreachable foreign88
flag competitors.
Thus, the Commission's efforts to coerce foreign firms into supplying subpoenaed documents by threatening to disband their conferences
contradicts Congressional intent.
C. Economic Ramifications of the Commission's Activity
The goal of the Shipping Act of 1916 was to advance the position
of our merchant marine. A similar goal underlies the policy of foreign
shipping powers.8 9 Foreign provisions outlawing the supplying of subpoenaed documents to the Commission are, in general, simply an expedient to protect foreign firms from regulation by the United States. 90
Thus, so long as foreign governments desire to maintain the economic
independence of their merchant marine, any unilateral attempt to
regulate the world's commerce will be resisted.91
The disbanding of conferences for failure of member firms to
comply with the Commission's subpoena demands will lead ultimately
to the elimination of the conference structure from the shipping industry. Although such action would create free competition, the net
result would be an even greater regulatory burden on the Commission.
This can be demonstrated by comparing present regulations with those
that would be necessary to insure the American carrier a competitive
position within a theoretically free market.
87 See FMC v. DeSmedt, 268 F. Supp. 972 (S.D.N.Y. 1967). Under the DeSmedt
decision, the Commission is also barred from obtaining judicial contempt orders to
bolster its position against recalcitrant foreign governments.
88 S. REP. No. 860, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. 25 (1961).
89 Dickson Report, supra note 79, at 191. "The almost universal tendency is to regard
a merchant marine ... as an instrument of national policy."
90 For example, the British response to a request for data during a 1963 Commission
hearing was the enactment of a bill levying fines of up to 1,000 pounds for compliance
with such requests without permission. Shipping Contracts and Commercial Document
Act 1964, c. 87.
91 "[S]o long as the present attitude of important foreign governments prevails in
regard to unilateral utility type regulation of ocean transportation, it is not a feasible
alternative to the conference system in maintaining rate stability." Dickson Report, at 193.
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American-flag liner participgttion in the conference system is
founded upon the premise that United States firms otherwise cannot
successfully compete with foreign competition. 92 Congress has provided
several regulatory safeguards which insure participation and protection
within the shipping conferences of the world: first, all American firms
must be granted admission into any economically desirable conference;93 second, all such conferences must be given the power to discriminate against independent competition and thus establish profitable
rates; 94 and third, all intraconference competitiveness must be strictly
regulated to avoid discrimination against the American-flag members. 95
92 "It is clear that the United States suffers a comparative and absolute disadvantage
in providing ocean transportation. To provide equivalent services costs us more than it
costs foreign suppliers." McGee, Ocean Freight Rate Conferences and the American
Merchant Marine, 27 U. CHm. L. Riv. 191, 307 (1960). See American Export Isbrandtsen
Lines, Inc. v. FMC, 380 F.2d 609, 616 (1967).
93 46 U.S.C. § 813 (1964); see Kharasch, Conferences of Carriers by Sea: Freedom oj
Rate Fixing, 23 J. AnR. L. & Com. 287 (1956). In discussing this provision the author states
The Merchant Marine Act of 1920 also added a new Section 14a ('46 U.S.C.
813) to the Act of 1916. This Section 14a, surely one of the most curious in Amer.
ican regulatory law, is directed only toward carriers not citizens of the United
States. These foreign carriers are to suffer the extraordinary sanction of refusal
of the right to enter United States ports for either of two offenses:

(2) Belonging to a conference covering commerce between foreign ports
(not in the foreign commerce of the United States) which conference uses deferred
rebates and refuses to admit United States citizen carriers to membership.
Id. at 294 (italics in original). See also id. at 302; McGee, Ocean Freight Rate Conferences
and the American Merchant Marine, 27 U. CHt. L. Rxv. 191, 251-68 (1960).
94 46 U.S.C. § 813a (1964); see American Export Isbrandtsen Lines, Inc. v. FMC, 380
F.2d 609 (D.C. Cir. 1967).
T]his legislation was a direct result of, and reaction to, the 1958 Isbrandtsen
decision.... [T]he Court [in Isbrandtsen] held that conference carriers could not
"'tie"shippers to the conference through restrictive dual rate contracts, because
this would have the effect of stifling the competition of independents,
The legislative reaction by Congress largely reflected the reaction of the
shipping industry. That reaction was that the abolition of dual rate contracts
would mean the destruction of the conference system, would create cut-throat
competition and ultimately would bring about the demise of the American
merchant marine, since, unprotected, it could not compete with lower-cost
foreign lines.
Id. at 616.
95 See note 60 supra; Outward Continental N. Pac. Freight Conf., F.M.C. No. 66-36
(Mar. 28, 1967); aff'd, 385 F.2d 981 (D.C. Cir. 1967); Admission to Conf. Membership-Pac.
Coast European Conf., 9 F.M.C. 241 (1966).
There is a secondary statutory defense similarly designed to protect the American-flag
lines within the conference. Shipping Act of 1916, §§ 14-14a, 46 U.S.C. §§ 812, 813 (1964).
,Section 14 is designed to remove those anti-competitive devices not authorized American
firms, such as deferred rebates and fighting ships, from the hands of our foreign competitors, in the hope of maintaining intra-conference equality. Similarly, § 14a provides for
the sanction of refusal of the right to enter United States ports for a continuing violation
of § 14. 1Kharasch, supra note 93, at 294. See also D. MARX, INTERNATIONAL SHIPPING CARTELS
260 (1953); McGee, supra note 93, at 232 n.92, 238.
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It is clear that foreign firms have been largely receptive to the first
requirement. Apparently, American participation has simply been
accepted as an additional cost of trading With the prosperous United
States market. Consequently, American firms have been able to enjoy
the profits of an artificially established rate without intensive Commission control.9 6 Conversely, as the Commission continues to disband conferences, the American firms will lose the advantage of artificially high
rates, and the Commission will be faced with the difficulty of investigating for sub rosa agreements establishing rates without American
participation. In light of the general approval of cartels and monopolistic agreements in many foreign countries, this would be a more
difficult job than the regulation of conferences.
The second requirement of our present regulatory approach allows
conferences to employ the dual rate contract principle to maintain an
artificial, competitive edge.97 The only Commission regulation necessary to obtain this result is the eliminatiori of anti-competitive devices
more drastic than the dual rate contract, such as deferred rebates98 and
fighting ships,9 9 neither of which are allowed to American firms. Once
again, foreign carriers have apparently acquiesced, and little Commission regulation has been needed. However, in a freely competitive situation, assuming again that American firms are not competitive, the
Commission would be forced to eliminate not only those activities presently restricted, but also the dual rate contract.
The final regulatory requirement insures that the American-flag
liner is not discriminated against within the conference organization.
Although both the 1961 amendment to section 15, requiring inter alia
that internal policing of conferences be established, 0 0 and the recent
disbanding of the Outward Continental North Pacific Freight Conference 01 indicate that certain difficulties exist in this area, removing the
conference wrapping from the individual firm will not eliminate the
problem. On the contrary, placing each member on his own would
increase clandestine bargaining agreements.
The ultimate economic effect of the Commission's recent decision
to disband conferences that refuse to comply with its subpoena and
discovery power is contrary to the public interest. The cumulative
result of a policy of disbandment would be a multiplication of coercive
98 McGee, supra note 93, at 260-68.
97 See note 94 supra.
98 46 U.S.C. § 812 (1964).
99 Id.

100 46 U.S.C. § 814 (1964); see note 60 supra.
101 Outward Continental N. Pac. Freight Conf., F.M.C. No. 66-36 (Mar. 28, 1967).
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anti-competitive activities by foreign firms, and an escalation of problems beyond the Commission's control.
Thus, in the Calcutta Conference case, the Commission should not
be granted the power to disband the conference under section 15, unless
there is absolutely no other way to protect the public against conference
rate-making infractions. The Commission, however, is by no means
powerless to meet an unjust or detrimental rate situation. A more
judicious application of the provisions of the Shipping Act would
achieve better results.
III
DISAPPROVING RATES RATHER THAN DISBANDING CONFERENCES-

A

TENTATIVE SOLUTION

A. Section 18(b)(5)
Section 18(b)(5)

10 2

offers the Commission an effective alternative

to disbanding. It sanctions control of individual rates that are "so unreasonably high or low as to be detrimental to the commerce of the
United States." By granting the power to disapprove a single rate, this
section allows the Commission to grant appropriate relief without
attacking the conference structure. Since necessary cost figures may be
gathered from United States conference members without foreign-firm
cooperation, the necessity of subpoenaing documents from foreign firms
isavoided.

Several cases demonstrate the feasibility of this approach.10 3 In a
recent investigation of the Hong Kong-U.S. Atlantic & Gulf Coast
trade, 04 the Commission adopted guidelines implementing United
States carriers' cost figures in section 18(b)(5) proceedings. The Commission stated that "a rate which fails to meet out-of-pocket costs of
the carrier quoting the rate" would be unreasonably low. 105 A similar
rule of thumb could be employed for excessive rates. To eliminate the
necessity of obtaining foreign data, the Commission indicated that
"a carrier may, by proving his own out-of-pocket costs, establish a rebuttable presumption of out-of-pocket costs prevailing generally in the
industry."'106 Although these guidelines were directed toward the situ102 75 Stat. 765 (1961), 46 U.S.C. § 817(b)(5) (1964).

103 See FMC v. Aktiebolaget Svenska Amerika Linien, 36 U.S.L.W. 4213 (U.S. Mar. 6,
1968); Investigation of Hong Kong-U.S. At. & Gulf Coast Tr., F.M.C. No. 67-1088 (Nov.
5, 1967).
104 F.M.C. No. 67-1088 (Nov. 5, 1967).
105 Id.
106 Id.
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ation where the complainant was an American conference member, and
thus presupposed that information concerning its cost figures would be
voluntarily supplied, the same procedure is available to exporters or
07
other non-conference partitioners.'
The Commission's procedure, applying criteria ascertainable from
United States sources, also eliminates due process objections to a shift
in the burden of proof on the basis of noncompliance with subpoena
demands. 0 8 Evidence of foreign cost figures is unnecessary to establish
a detrimental effect on American commerce, and the mere fact that a
foreign rate is proven to be below the out-of-pocket costs of an American-flag liner meets the statutory criteria. In the absence of a convincing demonstration that the rate in question is nevertheless desirable, it should be disapproved. A similar technique for shifting the
burden of proof in section 15 proceedings has been sustained by the
Supreme Court. 0 9
B. Scope of Effective Rate Regulation
Prior to the 1961 amendment, the Commission's only regulatory
power over rates was its threat to disband conferences whose rates were
"unreasonably high or low and therefor detrimental to the commerce
of the United States.""u 0 In 1961, Congress codified this test in section
18(b)(5)."' This did not broaden the Commission's power to regulate
rates, but simply allowed the Commission to avoid the harsh results of
disbanding an entire conference by applying its earlier standard to a
particular rate." 2 However, because section 18(b)(5) is cast in terms
disapproving existing rates it conflicts with the conference's power to
107 Section 27 empowers the Commission to obtain information from American-flag
carriers. 46 U.S.C. § 826 (1964).
108 See Soci6t Internationale v. Rogers, 857 U.S, 197 (1958).
109 FMC v. Aktiebolaget Svenska Amerika Linien, 36 U.S.L.W. 4213 (U.S. March 6,

1968).
The Court held that any agreement invalid under United States antitrust policy
"will be approved only if the conferences can 'bring forth such facts as would demonstrate
that the . . .rule was required by a serious transportation need, necessary to secure
important public benefits or in furtherance of a valid regulatory purpose of the Shipping
Act.'
Id. at 4215. The effect of this decision was to approve the Commission's policy of shifting
the burden of establishing that an agreement is in the "public interest" under § 15, at
least initially, to the conference, if the agreement on its face violates United States anti-

trust laws.

110 See Edmond Weil, Inc. v. Italian Line, 1 U.S.S.B.B. 395, 398 (19$5).
111 46 U.S.C. § 817(b)(5) (1964).
112 The assumption underlying this statement is that the Commission's threat to

disband those conferences that continued to use rates detrimental to the United States was
workable. This threat, however, was never carried out.
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modify at will rates based upon approved agreements. Section 15 provides:
Any agreement or any modification or cancellation of any
agreement not approved, or disapproved, by the Commission shall
be unlawful... except that tariff rates . . . agreed uporn by approved conferences ... shall be permitted to take effect without
prior approval .... 113
If the Commission is to deal with offending conferences rate by rate,
it must have the power to enforce its findings, not only against disapproved rates, but also against changes in previously approved rates that
are "permitted to take effect without prior approval," despite the fact
that such rates are designed to negate Commission decisions.1 4
Initially, however, the necessity of applying section 18(b)(5) is
limited by the requirement that the rate be based upon an approved
agreement. 1 5 If a conference fails to gain initial approval, the Commission, by virtue of its section 15 power, may issue a cease and desist
order, 116 and, if further action is necessary, antitrust sanctions may be
sought. 17 If a conference, under an initially approved agreement, makes
a drastic rate modification, the Commission, at its discretion,"18 can
require the conference to reacquire section 15 approval. 1 9 Thus, in the
drastic rate modification situation, the same sanctions available in the
non-initially approved situation are applicable.
Although the Commission's operation under section 15 limits, to
some extent, the application of section 18(b)(5), 120 the preponderance
of rate changes are simple modifications which may be regulated only
113 75 Stat. 764 (1961), 46 U.S.C. § 814 (1964).
114 See Comment, Rate Regulation in Ocean Shipping, 78 HARv. L. REv. 635, 646-47

(1964). The author suggests that section 18(b)(5) merely empowers the Commission to
disapprove the offending rate and that as a result it is unlikely that it will prove effective
in curbing detrimental rates.
115 46 U.S.C. § 814 (1964).
116 See Persian Gulf Outward Freight Conf. v. FMC, 375 F.2d 335 (D.C. Cir. 1967).
117 Only those "agreements, modifications, or cancellations lawful under this section
75 Stat. 764 (1961), 46 U.S.C.
... shall be excepted from the [antitrust] provisions .
§ 814 (1964).
118 The Commission, in its discretion, itself determines whether a proposal is a
."new agreement" or simply a "modification." See, Consolo v. FMC, 383 U.S. 607 (1966);
Persian Gulf Outward Freight Conf. v. FMC, 375 F.2d 335 (D.C. Cir. 1967). "A Commission determination that the conference falls within or without the approved agreement
must be given due deference by a reviewing court." Id. at 339.
119 See Persian Gulf Outward Freight Conf. v. FMC, 375 F.2d 335, 339 (D.C. Cir. 1967)
"[Tihe dual-level tariff changes by the conference are of such a magnitude as to constitute
a 'new' Section 15 agreement which has not been filed with or approved by the Commission."
120 See id. at 338-39.
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if "detrimental to the commerce of the United States."' 21 In Trans22
the Circuit Court for
Pacific Freight Conference of Japan v. FMC,1
between new agreedistinction
the
emphasized
the District of Columbia
ments and modifications, holding that the Commission did not have
the power to issue a cease and desist order when the order was aimed
at conference action undertaken pursuant to the terms of an approved
agreement. 2 3 Nevertheless, the Commission is not without recourse
when a conference disregards its findings that a particular rate violates
section 18(b)(5). Once the Commission has established such a violation,
any attempt to subvert its findings would be subject to a court imposed
injunction pending a final Commission determination of the absolute
minimum or maximum rate that may be employed. 124 The proof deduced from the initial section 18(b)(5) proceedings would enable the
Commission to establish rough maximum and minimum rates. Any
rate above or below these extremes would carry a prima facie presumption of detriment, and thus be grounds for an injunction. For example,
if a rate is shown to be clearly below an American-flag liner's out-ofpocket costs, any modifications of that rate remaining below such costs
would be subject to an injunctive proceeding pending further hearings
25
by the Commission.
121 75 Stat. 765 (1961), 46 U.S.C. § 817(b)(5) (1964).
122 302 F.2d 875 (D.C. Cir. 1962).
123 Id. at 879.
124 See West India Fruit & S.S. Co. v. Seairain Lines, Inc., 170 F.2d 775 (2d Cir. 1948),
cert. denied, 336 U.S. 908 (1949); FMC v. Atlantic & Gulf/Panama Canal Zone Conf., 241
F. Supp. 766 (S.D.N.Y. 1965).
125 In West India Fruit S.S. Co. v. Seatrain Lines, Inc., 170 F.2d 775 (2d Cir. 1948),
despite the fact that § 18(b)(5) had not yet been enacted, the Commission, as plaintiff,
sought and received an injunction to restrain the imposition of a 50% ratd cut pending a
hearing. The injunction was granted on the basis of a possible infraction of several general provisions of the Shipping Act and the likelihood of harm that would result if
retaliatory rate cutting were initiated by foreign lines. After the enactment of § 18(b)(5),
the Commission has an even more precise statutory guide upon which to base its appeal
for court assistance. The specific prohibitions of § 18(b)(5), coupled with the Commission's
ability to demonstrate, for example, that a specific rate is dearly below the out-of-potket
costs of comparable American lines, should be sufficient groufids for temporary injunctive
relief. The court in Seatrain held inapposite cases in which court action had been denied
because of the primary jurisdiction of the Commission. It pointed out that in the situation
at hand the Commission was in fact the party requesting injunctive aid and thus the
prohibition against preempting its authority was inapplicable.
More recently, the feasibility of injunctive relief was considered by a district court
in FMC v. Atlantic & Gulf/Panama Canal Zone Conf., 241 F. Supp. 766 (S.D.N.Y. 1965).
Although the court denied the requested injunction for "insufficiency of proof," it held
that it had "inherent power... to prevent irreparable harm and maintain the status quo
pending an administrative decision, applying traditional concepts of equity jurisprudence."
Id. at 777. Further, the Court emphasized that the "quantum of proof" necessary to establish injunctive relief paralleled the wording of §- 18(b)(5). Thus, the Commission need
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C. A Comparison-Disbandingv. Section 18(b)(5)
The theoretical difficulties inherent in any attempt to unilaterally
regulate the international shipping industry, Congress' refusal to grant
the power necessary to undertake this goal, the vast amount of litigation
stemming from the Commission's efforts in this direction, the recent
warnings of a Commission fact-finding report, and the difficulties that
undoubtedly will result from widespread use of antitrust sanctions in
lieu of internal regulation by the conference system, indicate that the
most desirable regulatory approach is one that protects American interests with a minimum of interference. Significantly, a comparison of the
Commission's present practice of disbanding noncomplying conferences
with the alternative of dealing individually with each rate modification
of an approved agreement under section 18(b)(5) demonstrates that the
difference is solely one of degree. The disbanding provisions of both
section 15 and section 18(b)(5) provide for identical sanctions of a
$1,000 per day fine and the revocation of antitrust exemption.1 26
By disbanding the Calcutta Conference,12 7 the Commission has
needlessly destroyed not only the rate in question, but an entire shipping conference consisting of many firms and a multitude of rates. This
practice promotes discrimination against American carriers, since in
an openly competitive situation, the Commission's ability to control
discriminatory practices is limited. Continued resistance by foreign
carriers willing to risk antitrust sanctions 128 makes effective regulation
difficult. 29 By applying antitrust only to situations where a conference
only demonstrate that the proposed modification is "detrimental to the commerce of the
United States" to gain injunctive assistance.
126 46 U.S.C. §§ 814, 817(b)(5) (1964).
127 Calcutta, East Coast of India & East Pakistan/U.S.A. Conf., F.M.C. No. 67-33 (Sept.
14, 1967).
128 Although prior to Carnation the general belief was that antitrust was totally inapplicable to the maritime industry, there is little doubt that jurisdiction is available
against foreign firms trading with the United States. See United States v. Pacific & Arctic
Co., 228 U.S. 87 (1913); United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir.
1945). In United States v. Hamburg-Amerikanische P.F.A. Gesellschaft, 200 F. 806, 807
(S.D.N.Y. 1911), the court stated:
Citizens of foreign countries are not free to restrain or monopolize the foreign
commerce of this country by entering into combinations abroad, nor by employing foreign vessels to effect their purpose. Such combinations are to be tested
by the same standard as similar combinations entered into here by citizens of
this country. The vital question in all cases is the same: Is the combination to so
operate in this country as to directly and materially affect our foreign commerce?
Id. at 807. See generally, W. FUGATE, FOREIGN COMMERCE AND THE ANTITRUST LAWS (1958).
129 See, Dickson Report, supra note 79, at 191.
[I]n the light of the possibility of retaliatory measures for practical purposes the
attitudes of various foreign governments must be given weight . . . . The effect
of retaliation and counter retaliation could be so serious as to, entirely stem the
flow of commerce between two contending nations.
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has continued to employ a disapproved rate, however, the Commission
can preserve the conference structure. Indeed, the possibility that the
accessibility of American firms might result in one-sided antitrust burdens is also reduced. In light of Congress's recent reapproval of the
conference system, and its repeated refusal to expand the Commission's
subpoena authority, the Commission's present position is untenable.
Charles Peter Raynor

